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Abstract 34 
Evidence for endemically low statistical power has recently cast neuroscience findings 35 
into doubt. If low statistical power plagues neuroscience, this reduces confidence in 36 
reported effects. However, if statistical power is not uniformly low, such blanket mistrust 37 
might not be warranted. Here, we provide a different perspective on this issue, analysing 38 
data from an influential paper reporting a median power of 21% across 49 meta-39 
analyses (Button et al., 2013). We demonstrate, using Gaussian mixture modelling, that 40 
the sample of 730 studies included in that analysis comprises several subcomponents; 41 
therefore the use of a single summary statistic is insufficient to characterise the nature of 42 
the distribution. We find that statistical power is extremely low for studies included in 43 
meta-analyses that reported a null result; and that it varies substantially across subfields 44 
of neuroscience, with particularly low power in candidate gene association studies. 45 
Thus, while power in neuroscience remains a critical issue, the notion that studies are 46 
systematically underpowered is not the full story: low power is far from a universal 47 
problem.  48 
 49 
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Significance statement 56 
Recently, researchers across the biomedical and psychological sciences have become 57 
concerned with the reliability of results. One marker for reliability is statistical power: the 58 
probability of finding a statistically significant result, given that the effect exists. Previous 59 
evidence suggests that statistical power is low across the field of neuroscience. Our 60 
results present a more comprehensive picture of statistical power in neuroscience: on 61 
average, studies are indeed underpowered—some very seriously so—but many studies 62 
show acceptable or even exemplary statistical power. We show that this heterogeneity in 63 
statistical power is common across most subfields in neuroscience (psychology, 64 
neuroimaging, etc.). This new, more nuanced picture of statistical power in neuroscience 65 
could affect not only scientific understanding, but potentially policy and funding decisions 66 
for neuroscience research. 67 
 68 
 69 
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Introduction 77 
Trust in empirical findings is of vital importance to scientific advancement, but publishing 78 
biases and questionable research practices can cause unreliable results (Nosek et al., 79 
2012; Button et al., 2013). In recent years, scientists and funders across the biomedical 80 
and psychological sciences have become concerned with what has been termed a crisis 81 
of replication and reliability (Barch and Yarkoni, 2013). 82 
One putative marker for the reliability of results is statistical power: the probability that a 83 
statistically significant result will be declared, given that the null hypothesis is false (i.e., 84 
a real effect exists). It can be shown that, in the context of field-wide underpowered 85 
studies, a smaller proportion of significant findings will reflect true positives than if power 86 
is universally high (Ioannidis, 2005). A recent influential paper by Button and colleagues 87 
(Button et al., 2013) calculated statistical power across all meta-analyses published in 88 
2011 that were labelled as “neuroscience” by Thomson Reuters Web of Science. It 89 
concluded that neuroscience studies were systematically underpowered, with a median 90 
statistical power of 21%, and that the proportion of statistically significant results that 91 
reflect true positives is therefore likely to be low. The prevalence of very low power has 92 
serious implications for the field. If the majority of studies are indeed underpowered, 93 
statistically significant findings are untrustworthy, and scientific inference will often be 94 
misinformed. This analysis provoked considerable debate in the field about whether 95 
neuroscience does indeed suffer from endemic low statistical power (Bacchetti, 2013; 96 
Quinlan, 2013). We sought to add nuance to this debate by re-analysing the original 97 
dataset using a more fine-grained approach, and provide a different perspective on 98 
statistical power in neuroscience. 99 
We extended the analyses of Button and colleagues (Button et al., 2013), using data 100 
from all 730 individual studies, which provided initial results that were consistent with the 101 
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original report (which used only the median-sized study in 49 meta-analyses). To 102 
quantify the heterogeneity of the dataset we made use of Gaussian mixture modelling 103 
(GMM) (Corduneanu and Bishop, 2001), which assumes that the data may be described 104 
as being composed of multiple Gaussian components. We then used model comparison 105 
to find the most parsimonious model for the data. We also categorised each study based 106 
on its methodology to examine whether low power is common to all fields of 107 
neuroscience.  108 
We find strong evidence that the distribution of power across studies is multi-modal, with 109 
the most parsimonious model tested including four components. Moreover, we show that 110 
candidate gene association studies and studies from meta-analyses with null results 111 
make up the majority of extremely low powered studies in the analysis of Button and 112 
colleagues. Although median power in neuroscience is low, the distribution of power is 113 
heterogeneous, and there are clusters of adequately and even well-powered studies in 114 
the field. Thus, our in-depth analysis reveals that the crisis of power is not uniform: 115 
instead, statistical power is extremely diverse across neuroscience. 116 
Methods 117 
Experimental design and analysis 118 
Re-analysing ‘power failures’ 119 
Our initial analysis took a similar approach to that of Button and colleagues, but contrary 120 
to their protocol (which reported power only for the median-sized study in each meta-121 
analysis: N=49), we report power for each of the 730 individual studies (see Figure 3a 122 
and Table 1). As in the original analysis, we defined power as the probability that a given 123 
study would declare a significant result, assuming that the population effect size was 124 
equal to the weighted mean effect size derived from the corresponding meta-analysis 125 
Power-up  Nord et al.  
 
6 
 
(note that this differs from ‘post-hoc’ power, in which the effect size would be assumed to 126 
be equal to the reported effect size from each individual study (O’Keefe, 2007)).  127 
For experiments with a binary outcome, power was calculated by assuming that the 128 
expected incidence or response rate for the control group (i.e. the base rate) was equal 129 
to that reported in the corresponding meta-analysis and, similarly, used an assumed 130 
“treatment effect” (odds or risk ratio) equal to that given by each meta-analysis. The test 131 
statistic used for the calculation was the log odds-ratio divided by its standard error. The 132 
latter was derived from a first order approximation, and estimated by the square root of 133 
the sum of the reciprocals of the expected values of the counts in the 2-by-2 summary 134 
table. The test statistic itself was then referenced to the standard normal distribution for 135 
the purposes of the power calculation. For studies reporting Cohen’s d, the assumed 136 
treatment effect was again taken directly from the corresponding meta-analysis, and all 137 
power calculations were based on the standard noncentral t-distribution. For 138 
comparability with the original study we calculated the median power across all 730 139 
individual studies which was equal to 23%, close to the 21% reported by Button and 140 
colleagues (2013). 141 
Figure 1 shows an overview of our analytical process. We additionally classified each 142 
study according to methodology: candidate gene association studies (N=234); 143 
psychology (N=198); neuroimaging (N=65); treatment trials (N=145); neurochemistry 144 
(N=50); and a miscellaneous category (N=38 studies from N=2 meta-analyses). Two 145 
independent raters categorized the 49 meta-analyses into these six subfields, with 47/49 146 
classified consistently; the remaining two were resolved following discussion. Before 147 
continuing our analysis in more depth, we present the reader with results that are directly 148 
comparable with the analysis of Button and colleagues (with the addition of the 149 
subfields; Table 2). These results are intended for comparison with our more nuanced 150 
characterisation of the distributions using GMMs presented below; given the results of 151 
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those GMMs (which suggest the these distributions are multi-modal and therefore not 152 
well characterised by a single measure of central tendency) they should not be used to 153 
draw strong inferences. 154 
 155 
Figure 1. Classification of studies for analysis  156 
Description of study methodology. GMM=Gaussian mixture model.  157 
 158 
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Table 1. Characteristics and classification of included meta-analyses  183 
Classification performed by two independent raters. k: number of studies; † indicates relative risk; CI: 184 
confidence interval; * indicates p<0.05.  185 
First author of study k Cohen’s d Odds ratio CI Significance Classification  
Babbage (Babbage et al., 2011)  13 -1.11  -0.97 to -1.25 * Psychology 
Bai (Bai, 2011)  18  1.47 1.22 to 1.77 * Genetic 
Bjorkhelm-Bergman (Björkhem-
Bergman et al 2011)
6 -1.20  1.6 to 8.0  * Treatment 
Bucossi (Bucossi et al., 2011)  21 .41  .17 to .65 * Neurochemistry 
Chamberlain (Chamberlain et 
al 2011)
11 -.51  .825 to 1.08 * Psychology 
Chang (Chang et al., 2011a) 56 -.19  -.29 to -.1  * Psychology 
Chang (Chang et al., 2011b) 6  .98 .86 to 1.12 - Genetic  
Chen (Chen et al., 2011)  12  .6 .52 to .69 * Miscellaneous 
Chung (Chung and Chua, 2011)  11  .67 .43 to 1.04 - Treatment 
Domellof (Domellöf et al., 2011) 14  2.12 1.59 to 2.78 * Psychology 
Etminan (Etminan et al., 2011)  14  0.8 .7 to .92 * Treatment 
Feng (Feng et al., 2011)  4  1.20 1.04 to 1.4 * Genetic 
Green (Green et al., 2011)  17 -.59  -.93 to -.257 * Neurochemistry 
Han (Han et al., 2011)  14  1.35 1.06 to 1.72 * Genetic 
Hannestad (Hannestad et al., 
2011)
13 -.13  -.55 to .29 - Treatment 
Hua (Hua et al., 2011)  27  1.13 1.05 to 1.21 * Genetic 
Lindson (Lindson and Aveyard, 
2011)
8  1.05 .92 to 1.19 - Treatment 
Liu (Liu et al., 2011a)  12  1.04 .88 to 1.22 - Genetic 
Liu (Liu et al., 2011b)  6  .89 .82 to .96 * Genetic 
MacKillop (MacKillop et al., 
2011)
57 .58  .509 to .641 * Psychology 
Maneeton (Maneeton et al., 
2011)
5  1.67† 1.23 to 2.26 * Treatment 
Ohi (Ohi et al., 2011)  6  1.12 1.00 to 1.26 * Genetic 
Olabi (Olabi et al., 2011)  14 -.4  -.62 to -.19 * Brain imaging 
Oldershaw (Oldershaw et al., 
2011)
10 -.51  -.73 to -.28 * Psychology 
Oliver (Oliver et al., 2011)  7  .86 0.79 to .95 * Treatment 
Peerbooms (Peerbooms et al., 
2011)
36  1.26 1.09 to 1.46 * Genetic 
Pizzagalli (Pizzagalli, 2011)  22 .92  .442 to 1.393 * Treatment 
Rist (Rist et al., 2011)  5  2.06 1.33 to 3.19 * Miscellaneous 
Sexton (Sexton et al., 2011)  8 .43  .063 to .799 * Brain imaging 
Shum (Shum et al., 2011)  11 .89  .75 to 1.02 * Psychology 
Sim (Sim et al., 2011)  2  1.23† 1.08 to 1.52 * Treatment 
Song (Song et al., 2011)  12 .15  .043 to .264 * Neurochemistry 
Sun (Sun et al., 2011)  6  1.93 1.55 to 2.41 * Genetic 
Tian (Tian et al., 2011)  4 1.26  .947 to 1.568 * Treatment 
Trzesniak (Trzesniak et al., 
2011)
11  1.98 1.33 to 2.94 * Brain imaging 
Veehof (Veehof et al., 2011)  8 .37  .20 to .53 * Treatment 
Vergouwen (Vergouwen et al., 
2011)
24  .83 .74 to .93 * Treatment 
Vieta (Vieta et al., 2011)  10  .68† .60 to .77 * Treatment 
Wisdom (Wisdom et al., 2011)  53 -.14  -.21 to -.07 * Genetic 
Witteman (Witteman et al., 
2011)
26 -1.41  -1.76 to -1.05 * Psychology 
Woon (Woon and Hedges, 
2011)
24 -.60  -.83 to -.37 * Brain imaging 
Xuan (Xuan et al., 2011)  20  1.00 .861 to 1.156 - Genetic 
Yang (cohort) (Yang et al., 
2011a)
14  1.38† 1.18 to 1.61 * Miscellaneous 
Yang (case control) (Yang et al., 
2011a)
7  2.48 1.93 to 3.19  * Miscellaneous 
Yang (Yang et al., 2011b) 3  0.67  .43 to .92 * Treatment 
Yuan (Yuan et al., 2011)  14  4.98 3.97 to 6.23 * Genetic 
Zafar (Zafar et al., 2011)  8  1.07 † .91 to 1.27 - Treatment 
Zhang (Zhang et al., 2011)  12  1.27 1.01 to 1.59 * Genetic 
Zhu (Zhu et al., 2011)  8 0.84  .18 to 1.49 * Brain imaging 
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Group of studies Median 
power 
(%) 
Min. 
power 
(%) 
Max. 
power 
(%) 
2.5th and 97.5th 
percentile (based 
on raw data) 
95% HDI (based on 
GMMs) 
Total k 
All studies  23 0.05 1 [0.05 to 1.00] [0.00 to 0.72],       
[0.8 to 1.00] 
730 
All studies excluding 
null 
30 0.05 1 [0.05 to 1.00] [0.01 to 0.73],     
[0.79 to 1.00] 
638 
Genetic  11 0.05 1 [0.05 to 0.94]  [0.00 to 0.44],    
[0.63 to 0.93] 
234 
Treatment  20 0.05 1 [0.05 to 1.00] [0.00 to 0.65],    
[0.91 to 1.00] 
 
145 
Psychology  50 0.07 1 [0.07 to 1.00] [0.02 to 0.24],    
[0.28 to 1.00] 
198 
Imaging  32 0.11 1 [0.11 to 1.00] [0.03 to 0.54],    
[0.71 to 1.00] 
65 
Neurochemistry  47 0.07 1 [0.07 to 1.00] [0.02 to 0.79],    
[0.92 to 1.00] 
50 
Miscellaneous  57 0.11 1 [0.11 to 1.00] [0.09 to 1.00] 38 
Table 2. Median power by study type 186 
Median, maximum, and minimum power subdivided by study type. We also provide the 2.5th and 187 
97.5th percentile of the frequency distribution of power estimates of individual studies for the raw data 188 
and 95% highest-density intervals (95% HDI) for the GMMs. We used highest density intervals (HDI) 189 
to summarise the intervals of the most probable values from the distribution. HDIs differ from CIs in 190 
that they represent the most probable values of the distribution rather than symmetric credible 191 
intervals in a central tendency. As a result, HDIs are more suitable for summarising skewed and 192 
multimodal distributions than CIs. HDIs were computed using the HDRCDE R toolbox, which finds the 193 
shortest intervals such that these intervals encompass the 95% most probable values of the 194 
distribution. Multiple intervals may be identified if a region between modes of the distribution is 195 
unrepresentative of the distribution (i.e. below the 5% threshold) (Wand et al., 1991; Hyndman, 1996; 196 
Samworth and Wand, 2010), which occurs for multimodal data. 197 
 198 
One or many populations? 199 
The common measures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode) may not 200 
always characterise populations accurately, because distributions can be complex, 201 
and made up of multiple ‘hidden’ subpopulations. Consider the distribution of height 202 
in the United States: the mean is 168.8±13.04 cm (Fryar et al., 2012). This statistic is 203 
rarely reported because the distribution comprises two distinct populations: male 204 
(175.9 ±15.03 cm) and female (162.1 cm ±10.8 cm). The mean of the male 205 
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population is greater than the 95th percentile of the female population. Thus, a single 206 
measure of central tendency fails to describe this distribution adequately.  207 
In an analogous fashion, the original paper of Button and colleagues reported a 208 
median of 21% power, which could be interpreted as implying a degree of statistical 209 
homogeneity across neuroscience. The use of the median as a summary statistic, 210 
while having the straightforward interpretation of ‘half above and half below’, also 211 
implies that the power statistics are drawn from a distribution with a single central 212 
tendency. As we show below, this assumption is contradicted by our analyses, which 213 
makes the median statistic difficult to interpret. It should be noted that Button and 214 
colleagues themselves described their results as demonstrating a ‘clear bimodal 215 
distribution’. Therefore we next explored the possibility that the power data originated 216 
from a combination of multiple distributions, using GMM. 217 
GMM (similar to latent class analysis and factor models (Lubke and Muthén, 2005)) 218 
can be used to represent complex density functions where the central limit theorem 219 
does not apply, such as in the case of bimodal or multi-modal distributions. We fit 220 
GMMs with varying numbers of ‘K’ unknown components to the data and performed 221 
model selection using the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) scores to compare 222 
models with different fit and complexity (the higher the number of ‘K’ unknown 223 
components the more complex the model). This allowed us to take a data-driven 224 
approach, as opposed to direct mixture models using a set number of components: 225 
thus, we were agnostic as to the number of components that emerged from the 226 
model. The GMM with the lowest BIC identifies the most parsimonious model, 227 
trading model fit against model complexity. A difference in BIC between models of 10 228 
or above on a natural logarithm scale is indicative of strong evidence in support of 229 
the model with the lower score (Kass and Raftery, 1995). To ensure that we used the 230 
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most suitable GMM for this dataset, we ran different GMM models: standard GMMs, 231 
regularized GMMs, and Dirichlet Process GMMs (see below for full methods, and 232 
Figure 2 for model comparison, and model selection). The results were similar using 233 
each of these techniques (see Figure 2). 234 
Finite Gaussian mixture model 235 
For a finite GMM, the corresponding likelihood function is given by (Corduneanu and 236 
Bishop, 2001): 237 
?????? ?? ??? ??? ???????
?
???
?
?
???
 
where πi denotes the mixing coefficient (proportions of the i–th component), 238 
????????  denotes the conditional probability of the observation xn given by a 239 
Gaussian distribution with parameters θi and D denotes the whole dataset of 240 
observations, xn. Generally speaking, this means that we believe that there is an 241 
underlying generative structure to the observed data, and that a mixture of Gaussian 242 
components would a reasonable description/approximation of the true generative 243 
process of this data. That is, we assume that the data D has been generated from a 244 
mixture of Gaussians distributions with varying means, variances, and weights 245 
(model parameters), which we want to uncover. To do so, we perform model 246 
inversion and find the point estimates of the model parameters that maximize the 247 
likelihood (see eq. 1 above) of the observed data (maximum likelihood estimation). 248 
 249 
Model inversion is performed using the iterative EM (expectation-maximisation) 250 
algorithm, which finds a local maximum of the likelihood function given initial starting 251 
parameters. We performed 50 restarts with kmeans++ initialization (Arthur and 252 
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Vassilvitskii, 2007). Multiple restarts were performed in order to find the global 253 
maximum of the likelihood (i.e., the best GMM for the data; that is, the parameters 254 
that maximize the chance of observing the data), as opposed to a local maximum. 255 
This allowed us to ensure that convergence was achieved for all GMMs, on all 256 
datasets. 257 
Traditionally, finite mixture modelling approaches require the number of components 258 
to be specified in advance of analysing the data. That is, for each finite Gaussian 259 
mixture model fitted to the data, one is required to input the number of components K 260 
present in the mixture (model inversion only estimates the parameters for each 261 
component). Finding the number of components present in the data is a model 262 
selection problem, and requires fitting multiple GMMs with varying numbers of 263 
components to the data, then comparing the model evidence for each fit, and 264 
selecting the most parsimonious model for the data in question (Bishop, 2006; 265 
Gershman and Blei, 2012; Murphy, 2012).  266 
It is worth noting, however, that GMMs can be subject to instabilities, such as 267 
singularities of the likelihood function. Specifically, it is possible for one component to 268 
‘collapse’ all of its variance onto a single data point, leading to an infinite likelihood 269 
(Bishop, 2006; Murphy, 2012) and to incorrect parameter estimation for the model. 270 
Multiple techniques have been developed in order to address this problem. The 271 
simplest and most commonly used technique is to introduce a regularization 272 
parameter. Another is to adopt a fully Bayesian approach and apply soft constraints 273 
on the possible range of likely parameter values, therefore preventing problematic 274 
and unrealistic parameter values. Both methodologies were used in this study, and 275 
we report on the resulting analysis for both implementations in the model selection 276 
section (below).  277 
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Finite Gaussian mixture model with regularization 278 
In typical finite mixture models, a regularization parameter can be added in order to 279 
avoid likelihood singularities. To do so, a very small value is added to the diagonal of 280 
the covariance matrix, enforcing positive-definite covariance and preventing infinitely 281 
small precision parameters for individual components. This model specification 282 
enables one to address the issue of ‘collapsing’ components but also enforces 283 
simpler explanations of the data, favouring models with fewer components. The 284 
larger the regularization parameter, the simpler the models will be, as single 285 
components will tend to encompass a larger subspace of the data partition. In this 286 
study we introduced a regularization parameter of 0.001, which represents a 287 
reasonable trade-off between preventing over-fitting components to noise in the 288 
dataset, while capturing the most salient features from the data (the separate peaks); 289 
therefore providing a better generative model of the data than using non-regularized 290 
GMMs. We used this approach for our primary inferences.   291 
Dirichlet Process Gaussian mixture model (DPGMM) 292 
Dirichlet Process (DP) Gaussian mixture models (DPGMMs) are a class of Bayesian 293 
non-parametric methods that avoid the issue of model selection when identifying the 294 
optimal number of components in a mixture model (Gershman and Blei, 2012; 295 
Murphy, 2012). With DPGMM, we expand the original GMM model to incorporate a 296 
prior over the mixing distribution, and a prior over the component parameters (mean 297 
and variance of components). Common choices for DPGMM priors are conjugate 298 
priors such as the normal-inverse-Wishart distribution over the mean and covariance 299 
matrix of components, and a non-parametric prior over mixing proportions based on 300 
the DP.  301 
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The DP, often referred to as the Chinese restaurant process or the stick-breaking 302 
process, is a distribution over infinite partitions of integers (Gershman and Blei, 303 
2012; Murphy, 2012). As a result, the DPGMM theoretically allows for an infinite 304 
number of components as it lets the number of components grow as the amount of 305 
data increases. The DP assigns each observation to a cluster with a probability that 306 
is proportional to the number of observations already assigned to that cluster. That 307 
is, the process will tend to cluster data points together, dependent on the population 308 
of the existing cluster and a concentration parameter ?. The smaller the ? 309 
parameter, the more likely it is that an observation will be assigned to an existing 310 
cluster with probability proportional to the number of elements already assigned to 311 
this cluster. This phenomenon is often referred to as the ‘rich get richer’. This 312 
hyperparameter ? indirectly controls how many clusters one expects to see from the 313 
data (another approach is to treat ? as unknown, using a gamma hyperprior over ?, 314 
and letting the Bayesian machinery infer the value (Blei and Jordan, 2006)).  315 
Implementation and analysis for the non-regularized finite GMMs, regularized finite 316 
GMMs, and DPGMMs was performed using Matlab R2015b (Mathworks Inc.), using 317 
the Statistics and Machine Learning toolbox, the Lightspeed toolbox and the vdpgm 318 
toolbox (Kurihara et al., 2007). 319 
Model selection 320 
The traditional mixture modelling approach requires the number of clusters or 321 
components to be specified in advance of analysing the data. However, in many 322 
settings, including here, one does not know the number of underlying components 323 
and would like to estimate this directly from the data. One approach typically used 324 
with finite mixture models is to fit the data with varying number of components and 325 
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then to select the model that provides the best trade-off between model fit (how well 326 
the model explains the data) and model complexity (how many component 327 
parameters are used in the model). A metric commonly used in this setting is the 328 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which allows one to compute an approximation 329 
to the Bayes factor (relative evidence) for a model. The BIC typically has two terms, 330 
the likelihood (how well the model fits the data) and a complexity term that penalizes 331 
more complex models with more free parameters (e.g. the number of components). 332 
The model with the lowest BIC metric is usually preferred as it provides the most 333 
parsimonious and generalizable model of the data. 334 
For each one of the following datasets model fits were performed using non-335 
regularized and regularized finite mixtures with up to 15 components (up to 10 336 
components for the subfield categories – Figure 2): the original dataset; the original 337 
dataset excluding null studies; each methodological subfield within the original 338 
dataset (Genetics, Psychology, Neurochemistry, Treatment, Imaging, and 339 
Miscellaneous studies); and the original dataset excluding each methodological 340 
subfield. Model selection was then performed using the BIC in order to select the 341 
most parsimonious model for each dataset. Figure 2 presents (for each dataset) the 342 
corresponding BIC metric for increasing levels of model complexity. Plain blue lines 343 
denote the BIC metric using non-regularized GMMs, while plain red lines denote the 344 
BIC using regularized GMMs. The BIC metric curve for non-regularized GMMs (blue 345 
line) exhibits wide jumps (Figure 2), while the function should remain relatively 346 
smooth as seen with regularized-GMMs (red line). This suggests that non-347 
regularized GMMs results were prone to overfitting and were inadequate for some of 348 
our datasets.  349 
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Finally, we compared different modelling methodologies, in order to select and report 350 
the most robust findings in terms of the estimation of the number of components. We 351 
compared non-regularized GMMs, regularized GMMs and DPGMMs on the same 352 
datasets (Figure 2), and found that regularized GMMs provided the most 353 
conservative estimation of the number of components. We therefore opted to report 354 
these results as the main findings.  355 
 356 
 357 
Figure 2. Model comparison and model selection analysis for Gaussian mixture models 358 
(GMM), regularized GMMs and Dirichlet process GMMs (DPGMMs). The blue and red lines 359 
display Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores (natural log scale) for non-regularized GMMs and 360 
regularized GMMs, respectively, for different levels of model complexity (number of mixture 361 
components). The lowest BIC score indicates the model that provides the best compromise between 362 
model fit (likelihood) and model complexity for the given dataset. Winning models for GMMs (purple 363 
dotted-dash vertical line), regularized GMMs (yellow dashed vertical line), and DPGMMs (green 364 
dotted vertical line) are clearly present for each dataset, enabling direct comparison of the output for 365 
each methodology. The regularized GMM approach provided the most parsimonious interpretation of 366 
the data on the two main datasets: all studies (a), excluding null studies (b) as well as 5 out of 6 367 
subfield datasets – (c) to (h). 368 
Results 369 
We analysed the original sample of 730 powers (see histogram in Figure 3a). If the 370 
median were the most appropriate metric to describe the distribution of powers across 371 
studies, we would expect the GMM to produce a solution containing only a single 372 
component. Instead, the most parsimonious GMM solution included four components, 373 
with strong evidence in favour of this model versus either of the next best models (i.e. 374 
GMMs with 3 or 5 components - see Figure 2). Importantly, this model revealed that the 375 
overall distribution of power appears to be composed of sub-groups of lower and higher 376 
powered studies (overlay in Figure 3a). We next explored possible sources of this 377 
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variability, considering the influence of both null effects and specific subfields of 378 
neuroscience.  379 
 380 
 381 
 382 
 383 
Figure 3. Power of studies  384 
Figure 3a-b: Histograms depicting the distribution of study powers across all 730 studies (a) 385 
and across studies excluding null meta-analyses (b). However, we note that excluding power 386 
statistics from studies included in null meta-analyses may provide an overestimation of power, 387 
because in many instances there remains uncertainty as to whether or not a true effect exists. Pale 388 
overlay: results of the regularised Gaussian mixture model (GMM), identifying four components (C1, 389 
C2, C3, C4) and their relative weights within the dataset. Below the histogram, pie charts depict 390 
methodological subfields, as well as null meta-analyses, contributing to each component. The null 391 
studies (white pie-chart sections) comprise 52 genetic studies and 40 treatment studies. The dark 392 
blue line shows the sum of the components (overall GMM prediction). c-h: histograms depicting the 393 
distribution of study powers across all meta-analyses, separated by subfield: candidate gene 394 
association studies (c); psychology studies (d); neurochemistry studies (e); treatment studies (f); 395 
imaging studies (g); miscellaneous studies (h). Pale overlays show the results of the regularised GMM 396 
for each subfield; the dark lines show the sum of the components (overall GMM prediction). 397 
 398 
When is an effect not an effect? 399 
The first important source of variability we considered relates to the concept of power 400 
itself. The calculation of power depends not just on the precision of the experiment 401 
(heavily influenced by the sample size), but also on the true population effect size. 402 
Logically, power analysis requires that an effect (the difference between population 403 
distributions) actually exists. Conducting a power analysis when no effect exists violates 404 
this predicate, and will therefore yield an uninterpretable result. Indeed, when no effect 405 
exists the power statistic becomes independent of the sample size and is simply equal to 406 
the Type I error rate; which by definition is the probability of declaring a significant result 407 
under the null hypothesis.  408 
To illustrate this point, consider the meta-analysis titled ‘No association between APOE 409 
epsilon 4 allele and multiple sclerosis susceptibility’ (Xuan et al., 2011), which included a 410 
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total of 5,472 cases and 4,727 controls. The median effect size (odds ratio) reported was 411 
precisely 1.00, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.861-1.156. Button and colleagues 412 
calculated the median power to be 5%, which is equal to the Type I error rate. However, 413 
as is evident from the paper’s title, this meta-analysis was clearly interpreted by its 414 
authors as indicating a null effect, which is consistent with the observed result. Indeed, 415 
in this case the power is 5% for both the largest (N>3000) and the smallest (N<150) 416 
study in the meta-analysis. In such cases the estimate of 5% power is not easily 417 
interpretable. 418 
On the other hand, it is problematic to assume that a non-significant meta-analytic 419 
finding can be taken as evidence there is no true effect; in the Frequentist statistical 420 
framework, failure to reject the null hypothesis cannot be interpreted as unambiguous 421 
evidence that no effect exists (due to the potential for false negative results). For 422 
example, reference 16 (‘Effects on prolongation of Bazett’s corrected QT interval of 423 
seven second-generation antipsychotics in the treatment of schizophrenia: a meta-424 
analysis’) reported a median effect size (odds ratio) of 0.67, with a 95% confidence 425 
interval from 0.43-1.04. While this result was non-significant, the point estimate of the 426 
effect size is greater than those from several meta-analyses that did achieve statistical 427 
significance, and in our view it would be premature to conclude that this effect does not 428 
exist.  429 
These examples illustrate the difficulty in deciding whether conducting a power analysis 430 
is appropriate. Even tiny effect sizes could hypothetically still exist: in any biological 431 
system the probability that an effect is precisely null is itself zero – therefore all effects 432 
“exist” by this definition (with certain exceptions, e.g. in the context of randomization), 433 
even if to detect them we might need to test more individuals than are currently alive. 434 
However, the notion of “falsely rejecting the null hypothesis” then loses its meaning 435 
(Jacob Cohen, 1994). One approach would be to assume that an effect does not exist 436 
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until the observed evidence suggests that the null hypothesis can be rejected, consistent 437 
with the logical basis of classical statistical inference. This would avoid any potential bias 438 
towards very low power estimates due to non-existent effects. On the other hand, this 439 
approach raises the potential problem of excluding effects that are genuinely very small, 440 
which may cause a bias in the other direction. Within the constraints of the null 441 
hypothesis significance testing framework, it is impossible to be confident that an effect 442 
does not exist at all. Therefore, we cannot simply assume an effect does not exist after 443 
failing to reject the null hypothesis, since a small effect could go undetected.  444 
Motivated by this logic, we initially included studies from ‘null meta-analyses’ (i.e. where 445 
the estimated effect size from the meta-analysis was not significantly different from the 446 
null at the conventional alpha=0.05) in our GMMs (Figure 3a). However, we note that 447 
excluding power statistics from studies included in null meta-analyses may provide an 448 
overestimation of power, because in many instances there remains uncertainty as to 449 
whether or not a true effect exists. Nonetheless, with the above caveats in mind, we also 450 
wished to assess the degree to which null meta-analyses may have impacted the 451 
results. Null results occurred in 7 of the 49 meta-analyses (92 of the 730 individual 452 
studies), contributing a substantial proportion of the extremely low powered studies 453 
(<10% power; Figure 3a, white pie chart segment of C1). When we restricted our 454 
analysis only to studies within meta-analyses that reported statistically significant results 455 
(‘non-null’ meta-analyses), the median study power (unsurprisingly) increased, but only 456 
slightly, to 30%, and the nature of the resulting GMM distribution did not change 457 
substantially (see Figure 3b). Thus, excluding null meta-analyses does not provide a 458 
radically different picture. Therefore, we also examined another potential contributor to 459 
power variability in neuroscience: the influence of specific subfields of neuroscience.  460 
Power in neuroscience subfields 461 
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As described above, we categorised each meta-analysis into one of six methodological 462 
subfields. Interestingly, statistical power varied significantly according to subfield 463 
(permutation test of equivalence: p<0.001), with genetic association studies lower (11% 464 
median power) than any other subfield examined (all Mann-Whitney U tests p<0.001). 465 
This is consistent with the original report by Button and colleagues, which reported the 466 
median power of animal studies (18% and 31% for two meta-analyses) and structural 467 
brain imaging studies (8% across 41 meta-analyses). However, even within specific 468 
subfields, the distribution of power is multimodal (see Figure 3c-h). This could represent 469 
variability in statistical practices across studies, but another possible explanation is that 470 
the size of the effect being studied varies substantially between meta-analyses, even 471 
within the same subfield. This alternative explanation may, at least in part, account for 472 
the variability between (and within) subfields of neuroscience.  473 
The large number of extremely low powered candidate gene association studies 474 
warrants additional comment. These were included in the original analysis because the 475 
Web of Science classifies such studies as “neuroscience” if the phenotypes in question 476 
are neurological or psychiatric disorders. However, modern genome-wide association 477 
studies have revealed that the overwhelming majority of candidate gene association 478 
studies have been underpowered, because the reliable associations that have been 479 
identified are extremely small (Flint and Munafò, 2013); thus, very low power is expected 480 
within this subgroup, which our analysis confirms (see Figure 3c). This subgroup of 481 
studies can offer important lessons to the rest of neuroscience: without large genetic 482 
consortia, the field of neuropsychiatric genetics might still be labouring under the 483 
misapprehension that individual common variants make substantial contributions to the 484 
risk for developing disorders. Providing that sampling and measurement are 485 
standardised, pooling data across multiple sites has the potential to improve dramatically 486 
not only statistical power, but also the precision on estimates of effect size. 487 
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Since numerous studies report that candidate gene association studies are severely 488 
underpowered (Klerk et al., 2002; Colhoun et al., 2003; Duncan and Keller, 2011), and 489 
given that candidate gene association studies comprised over one-third of our total 490 
sample of studies, we suspected that they might contribute heavily to the lowest-power 491 
peak in our distribution. We confirmed this: in the absence of genetic studies, many 492 
studies remained underpowered, but the distribution contained proportionally fewer 493 
studies in the lowest-power peak (around 10% power) (Figure 4a). Although low power 494 
is clearly not limited to candidate gene association studies, they nonetheless seem to 495 
have a greater influence on the overall power distribution than any other subfield, 496 
skewing the distribution towards the lowest-power peak (Figure 4b-f). 497 
 498 
Figure 4. Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) excluding each subfield.  499 
GMMs for the whole population of studies excluding genetic studies (a), excluding psychology studies 500 
(b), excluding neurochemistry studies (c), excluding treatment studies (d), excluding imaging studies 501 
(e), and excluding the remaining miscellaneous studies (f). Compare with the distribution including all 502 
studies (Figure 3a). 503 
 504 
Estimations of effect size 505 
An important factor contributing to the estimation of power is whether the effect size was 506 
estimated accurately a priori. If researchers initially overestimated the effect size, even 507 
the sample size specified by a power calculation would be insufficient to detect a real, 508 
but smaller effect. Interestingly, our analysis also shows the existence of very high 509 
powered studies within neuroscience, in which far more subjects have been included 510 
than would technically be warranted by a power analysis. In this case, an a priori 511 
underestimate of effect size could yield a very high powered study, if an effect proves to 512 
be larger than initially expected (which has occasionally been reported (Open Science 513 
Collaboration, 2015)). Another important consideration is that an over-estimation of 514 
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effect size might occur due to publication bias, which will skew effect size estimates from 515 
meta-analyses upwards, resulting in an optimistic power estimate. This is an important 516 
caveat to the results we report here: a bias toward publishing significant results means 517 
that the power estimates we report will represent upper bounds on the true power 518 
statistics. Unfortunately, we could not adequately address this potential confound 519 
directly, since tests of publication bias themselves have very low power, particularly if 520 
the number of studies in a meta-analysis is low. However, publication bias has long 521 
been reported in psychology (Francis, 2012) and neuroscience (Sena et al., 2010), so it 522 
is reasonable to assume that it has inflated estimates of statistical power in these 523 
analyses. 524 
Simulating power in hypothetical fields 525 
One clear conclusion of our analyses is that the interplay between the proportion of true 526 
effects and the power to detect those effects is crucial in determining the power 527 
distribution of a field. We simulated four power graphs for hypothetical fields to illustrate 528 
this point: one with low power (~50%), but where all effects exist (Figure 5a); one with 529 
high power (~90%), where all effects exist (Figure 5b); one with low power (~50%), 530 
where only a minority (25%) of effects exist (Figure 5c); and high power (~90%), but 531 
where only a minority (25%) of effects exist (Figure 5d). We found that the ‘low power’ 532 
field did not resemble the distribution of power in neuroscience we observed (Figure 3a). 533 
Instead, our findings were closest to a mixture of two distributions: Figure 5c, with low 534 
(~50%) power, and where only 25% of findings are true effects; and Figure 5d, with high 535 
(~90%) power, but where only 25% of findings are true effects. This would be consistent 536 
with the notion that the absence of true effects may contribute to the distribution of 537 
statistical power in neuroscience. 538 
Figure 5. Simulated power distributions for four hypothetical fields. (a) ‘Easy field’ with low 539 
power (~0.5) and all effects exist; (b) ‘Easy field’ with high power (~0.9) and all effects exist; (c) ‘Hard 540 
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field’ with low power (~0.5) (for those effects that exist), but where effects exist in only 25% of cases; 541 
(d) ‘Hard field’ with high power (~0.9) (for those effects that exist), but where effects exist in only exist 542 
in 25% of cases. Power distributions were simulated by generating 50,000 samples with fixed sample-543 
size (N=45) while varying effect-size. For each panel, the effect-size was sampled from a truncated 544 
(effect-size>0) Gaussian distribution with mean 0.3 (a & c) or 0.49 (b & d), so as to represent low or 545 
high power respectively. For the ‘hard’ fields (c & d), 75% of the effect-size sample was generated 546 
from a half-Gaussian distribution with mean=0. SD was set to 0.07 for all effect size distributions. 547 
Similar results can be obtained by fixing the effect size and varying the sample size.   548 
Discussion 549 
Implications for neuroscience 550 
We argue that a very influential analysis (cited over 1500 times at the time of writing) 551 
does not adequately describe the full variety of statistical power in neuroscience. Our 552 
analyses show that the dataset is insufficiently characterized by a single distribution. 553 
Instead, power varies considerably, including between subfields of neuroscience, and is 554 
particularly low for candidate gene association studies. Conducting power analyses for 555 
null effects may also contribute to low estimates in some cases, though determining 556 
when this has occurred is challenging. Importantly, however, power is far from adequate 557 
in every subfield.  558 
Our analyses do not negate the importance of the original work in highlighting poor 559 
statistical practice in the field, but they do reveal a more nuanced picture. In such a 560 
diverse field as neuroscience, it is not surprising that statistical practices differ. While 561 
Button and colleagues were careful to point out that they identified a range of powers in 562 
neuroscience, their reporting of a median result could be interpreted as implying that the 563 
results were drawn from a single distribution, which our analyses suggest is not the 564 
case. We confirm that low power is clearly present in many studies, and agree that 565 
focusing on power is a critical step in improving the replicability and reliability of findings 566 
in neuroscience. However, we also argue that low statistical power in neuroscience is 567 
neither consistent nor universal.  568 
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Ethical issues accompany both under- and over-powered studies. Animal sacrifices, 569 
drugs taken to human trials, and government funding are all wasted if power is too low. 570 
However, blindly increasing sample size across the board, simply to satisfy concerns 571 
about field-wide power failures, is also not the best use of resources. Instead, each 572 
study design needs to be considered on its own merits. In this vein, one response to the 573 
original article pointed out that any measure of a study’s projected value suffers from 574 
diminishing marginal returns: every additional animal or human participant adds less 575 
statistical value than the previous one (Bacchetti et al., 2005, 2008; 2013).  576 
Studies with extremely large sample sizes can also fall prey to statistically significant 577 
findings for trivial effects that are unlikely to be either theoretically or clinical important 578 
(Lenth, 2001; Ioannidis, 2005; Friston, 2012; Quinlan, 2013). In other words, the 579 
assessment of power is determined by what we consider to be an interesting (i.e. 580 
nontrivial) effect size (Cohen, 1988). This dependency means that power considerations 581 
are meaningless in the absence of assumptions about how large effect sizes need to be 582 
in order to be considered theoretically or clinically important; and this may vary 583 
dramatically across different fields. This is particularly relevant in fields where multiple 584 
comparisons are performed routinely, such as genetics and neuroimaging (Friston, 585 
2012). Conversely, smaller studies can only detect large effect sizes, and may suffer 586 
from imprecise estimates of effect size and interpretive difficulties. Crucially, there is no 587 
single study design that will optimise power for every genetic locus or brain area. In fact, 588 
power estimates for individual studies are themselves extremely noisy and may say little 589 
about the actual power in any given study. However, a move away from presenting only 590 
p-values and towards reporting point estimates and confidence intervals (as long 591 
advocated by statisticians), and towards sharing data to improve such estimates, would 592 
allow researchers to make better informed decisions about whether an effect is likely to 593 
be clinically or theoretically useful. 594 
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 595 
 596 
Conclusion 597 
We have demonstrated the great diversity of statistical power in neuroscience. Do our 598 
findings lessen concerns about statistical power in neuroscience? Unfortunately not. In 599 
fact, the finding that the distribution of power is highly heterogeneous demonstrates an 600 
undesirable inconsistency, both within and between methodological subfields. Yet within 601 
this variability are several appropriately, and even very high powered studies. Therefore, 602 
we should not tar all studies with the same brush, but instead encourage investigators to 603 
engage in the best research practices, including preregistration of study protocols 604 
(ensuring the study will have sufficient power), routine publication of null results, and 605 
avoiding practices such as p-hacking that lead to biases in the published literature.  606 
 607 
 608 
 609 
 610 
 611 
 612 
 613 
 614 
 615 
 616 
 617 
 618 
 619 
 620 
Power-up  Nord et al.  
 
26 
 
 621 
 622 
 623 
 624 
References 625 
Babbage DR, Yim J, Zupan B, Neumann D, Tomita MR, Willer B (2011) Meta-analysis of facial affect 626 
recognition difficulties after traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychology 25:277. 627 
Bacchetti P (2013) Small sample size is not the real problem. Nat Rev Neurosci 14:585–585. 628 
Bacchetti P, McCulloch CE, Segal MR (2008) Simple, defensible sample sizes based on cost efficiency. 629 
Biometrics 64:577–585. 630 
Bacchetti P, Wolf LE, Segal MR, McCulloch CE (2005) Ethics and sample size. Am J Epidemiol 631 
161:105–110. 632 
Bai H (2011) Meta-analysis of 5, 10-methylenetetrahydrofolate reductase gene poymorphism as a 633 
risk factor for ischemic cerebrovascular disease in a Chinese Han population. Neural Regen 634 
Res 6:277–285. 635 
Barch DM, Yarkoni T (2013) Introduction to the special issue on reliability and replication in cognitive 636 
and affective neuroscience research. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 13:687–689. 637 
Bishop CM (2006) Pattern recognition and machine learning. springer New York. 638 
Björkhem-Bergman L, Asplund AB, Lindh JD (2011) Metformin for weight reduction in non-diabetic 639 
patients on antipsychotic drugs: a systematic review and meta-analysis. J Psychopharmacol 640 
(Oxf) 25:299–305. 641 
Blei DM, Jordan MI (2006) Variational inference for Dirichlet process mixtures. Bayesian Anal 1:121–642 
143. 643 
Bucossi S, Ventriglia M, Panetta V, Salustri C, Pasqualetti P, Mariani S, Siotto M, Rossini PM, Squitti R 644 
(2011) Copper in Alzheimer’s disease: a meta-analysis of serum, plasma, and cerebrospinal 645 
fluid studies. J Alzheimers Dis 24:175–185. 646 
Button KS, Ioannidis JP, Mokrysz C, Nosek BA, Flint J, Robinson ES, Munafò MR (2013) Power failure: 647 
why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience. Nat Rev Neurosci 14:365–648 
376. 649 
Chamberlain SR, Robbins TW, Winder-Rhodes S, Müller U, Sahakian BJ, Blackwell AD, Barnett JH 650 
(2011) Translational approaches to frontostriatal dysfunction in attention-651 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder using a computerized neuropsychological battery. Biol 652 
Psychiatry 69:1192–1203. 653 
Chang W, Arfken CL, Sangal MP, Boutros NN (2011a) Probing the relative contribution of the first and 654 
second responses to sensory gating indices: A meta-analysis. Psychophysiology 48:980–992. 655 
Power-up  Nord et al.  
 
27 
 
Chang X-L, Mao X-Y, Li H-H, Zhang J-H, Li N-N, Burgunder J-M, Peng R, Tan E-K (2011b) Functional 656 
parkin promoter polymorphism in Parkinson’s disease: new data and meta-analysis. J Neurol 657 
Sci 302:68–71. 658 
Chen C, Xu T, Chen J, Zhou J, Yan Y, Lu Y, Wu S (2011) Allergy and risk of glioma: a meta-analysis. Eur 659 
J Neurol 18:387–395. 660 
Chung AK, Chua S (2011) Effects on prolongation of Bazett’s corrected QT interval of seven second-661 
generation antipsychotics in the treatment of schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. J 662 
Psychopharmacol (Oxf) 25:646–666. 663 
Cohen J (1988) Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Vol. 2. Lawrence Earlbaum 664 
Assoc Hillsdale NJ. 665 
Corduneanu A, Bishop CM (2001) Variational Bayesian model selection for mixture distributions. In, 666 
pp 27–34. Morgan Kaufmann Waltham, MA. 667 
Domellöf E, Johansson A-M, Rönnqvist L (2011) Handedness in preterm born children: a systematic 668 
review and a meta-analysis. Neuropsychologia 49:2299–2310. 669 
Etminan N, Vergouwen MD, Ilodigwe D, Macdonald RL (2011) Effect of pharmaceutical treatment on 670 
vasospasm, delayed cerebral ischemia, and clinical outcome in patients with aneurysmal 671 
subarachnoid hemorrhage: a systematic review and meta-analysis. J Cereb Blood Flow 672 
Metab 31:1443–1451. 673 
Feng X, Wang F, Zou Y, Li W, Tian Y, Pan F, Huang F (2011) Association of FK506 binding protein 5 674 
(FKBP5) gene rs4713916 polymorphism with mood disorders: a meta-analysis. Acta 675 
Neuropsychiatr 23:12–19. 676 
Flint J, Munafò MR (2013) Candidate and non-candidate genes in behavior genetics. Curr Opin 677 
Neurobiol 23:57–61. 678 
Francis G (2012) Too good to be true: Publication bias in two prominent studies from experimental 679 
psychology. Psychon Bull Rev 19:151–156. 680 
Friston K (2012) Ten ironic rules for non-statistical reviewers. Neuroimage 61:1300–1310. 681 
Fryar C, Gu Q, Ogden (2012) Anthropometric Reference Data for Children and Adults: United States, 682 
2007-2010. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 683 
Gershman SJ, Blei DM (2012) A tutorial on Bayesian nonparametric models. J Math Psychol 56:1–12. 684 
Green M, Matheson S, Shepherd A, Weickert C, Carr V (2011) Brain-derived neurotrophic factor 685 
levels in schizophrenia: a systematic review with meta-analysis. Mol Psychiatry 16:960–972. 686 
Han X-M, Wang C-H, Sima X, Liu S-Y (2011) Interleukin-6− 174G/C polymorphism and the risk of 687 
Alzheimer’s disease in Caucasians: A meta-analysis. Neurosci Lett 504:4–8. 688 
Hannestad J, DellaGioia N, Bloch M (2011) The effect of antidepressant medication treatment on 689 
serum levels of inflammatory cytokines: a meta-analysis. Neuropsychopharmacology 690 
36:2452–2459. 691 
Power-up  Nord et al.  
 
28 
 
Hua Y, Zhao H, Kong Y, Ye M (2011) Association between the MTHFR gene and Alzheimer’s disease: a 692 
meta-analysis. Int J Neurosci 121:462–471. 693 
Hyndman RJ (1996) Computing and graphing highest density regions. Am Stat 50:120–126. 694 
Ioannidis JP (2005) Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Med 2:e124. 695 
Jacob Cohen (1994) The earth is round (p<0.05). Am Psychol 49:997–1003. 696 
Kass RE, Raftery AE (1995) Bayes factors. J Am Stat Assoc 90:773–795. 697 
Kurihara K, Welling M, Teh YW (2007) Collapsed Variational Dirichlet Process Mixture Models. In, pp 698 
2796–2801. 699 
Lenth RV (2001) Some practical guidelines for effective sample size determination. Am Stat 55:187–700 
193. 701 
Lindson N, Aveyard P (2011) An updated meta-analysis of nicotine preloading for smoking cessation: 702 
investigating mediators of the effect. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 214:579–592. 703 
Liu H, Liu M, Wang Y, Wang X-M, Qiu Y, Long J-F, Zhang S-P (2011a) Association of 5-HTT gene 704 
polymorphisms with migraine: a systematic review and meta-analysis. J Neurol Sci 305:57–705 
66. 706 
Liu J, Sun Q, Tang B, Hu L, Yu R, Wang L, Shi C, Yan X, Pan Q, Xia K (2011b) PITX3 gene polymorphism 707 
is associated with Parkinson’s disease in Chinese population. Brain Res 1392:116–120. 708 
Lubke GH, Muthén B (2005) Investigating population heterogeneity with factor mixture models. 709 
Psychol Methods 10:21. 710 
MacKillop J, Amlung MT, Few LR, Ray LA, Sweet LH, Munafò MR (2011) Delayed reward discounting 711 
and addictive behavior: a meta-analysis. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 216:305–321. 712 
Maneeton N, Maneeton B, Srisurapanont M, Martin SD (2011) Bupropion for adults with attention-713 
deficit hyperactivity disorder: Meta-analysis of randomized, placebo-controlled trials. 714 
Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 65:611–617. 715 
Murphy KP (2012) Machine learning: a probabilistic perspective. MIT press. 716 
Nosek BA, Spies JR, Motyl M (2012) Scientific utopia II. Restructuring incentives and practices to 717 
promote truth over publishability. Perspect Psychol Sci 7:615–631. 718 
Ohi K, Hashimoto R, Yasuda Y, Fukumoto M, Yamamori H, Umeda-Yano S, Kamino K, Ikezawa K, 719 
Azechi M, Iwase M (2011) The SIGMAR1 gene is associated with a risk of schizophrenia and 720 
activation of the prefrontal cortex. Prog Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry 35:1309–721 
1315. 722 
O’Keefe DJ (2007) Brief report: post hoc power, observed power, a priori power, retrospective 723 
power, prospective power, achieved power: sorting out appropriate uses of statistical power 724 
analyses. Commun Methods Meas 1:291–299. 725 
Power-up  Nord et al.  
 
29 
 
Olabi B, Ellison-Wright I, McIntosh AM, Wood SJ, Bullmore E, Lawrie SM (2011) Are there progressive 726 
brain changes in schizophrenia? A meta-analysis of structural magnetic resonance imaging 727 
studies. Biol Psychiatry 70:88–96. 728 
Oldershaw A, Hambrook D, Stahl D, Tchanturia K, Treasure J, Schmidt U (2011) The socio-emotional 729 
processing stream in anorexia nervosa. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 35:970–988. 730 
Oliver BJ, Kohli E, Kasper LH (2011) Interferon therapy in relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis: a 731 
systematic review and meta-analysis of the comparative trials. J Neurol Sci 302:96–105. 732 
Open Science Collaboration (2015) Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science 733 
349:aac4716. 734 
Peerbooms OL, van Os J, Drukker M, Kenis G, Hoogveld L, De Hert M, Delespaul P, van Winkel R, 735 
Rutten BP (2011) Meta-analysis of MTHFR gene variants in schizophrenia, bipolar disorder 736 
and unipolar depressive disorder: evidence for a common genetic vulnerability? Brain Behav 737 
Immun 25:1530–1543. 738 
Pizzagalli DA (2011) Frontocingulate dysfunction in depression: toward biomarkers of treatment 739 
response. Neuropsychopharmacology 36:183–206. 740 
Quinlan PT (2013) Misuse of power: in defence of small-scale science. Nat Rev Neurosci 14:585–585. 741 
Rist PM, Diener H-C, Kurth T, Schürks M (2011) Migraine, migraine aura, and cervical artery 742 
dissection: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Cephalalgia 31:886–896. 743 
Samworth R, Wand M (2010) Asymptotics and optimal bandwidth selection for highest density 744 
region estimation. Ann Stat 38:1767–1792. 745 
Sena ES, Van Der Worp HB, Bath PM, Howells DW, Macleod MR (2010) Publication bias in reports of 746 
animal stroke studies leads to major overstatement of efficacy. PLoS Biol 8:e1000344. 747 
Sexton CE, Kalu UG, Filippini N, Mackay CE, Ebmeier KP (2011) A meta-analysis of diffusion tensor 748 
imaging in mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer’s disease. Neurobiol Aging 32:2322-e5. 749 
Shum D, Levin H, Chan RC (2011) Prospective memory in patients with closed head injury: a review. 750 
Neuropsychologia 49:2156–2165. 751 
Sim H, Shin B-C, Lee MS, Jung A, Lee H, Ernst E (2011) Acupuncture for carpal tunnel syndrome: a 752 
systematic review of randomized controlled trials. J Pain 12:307–314. 753 
Song F, Poljak A, Valenzuela M, Mayeux R, Smythe GA, Sachdev PS (2011) Meta-analysis of plasma 754 
amyloid-β levels in Alzheimer’s disease. J Alzheimers Dis 26:365–375. 755 
Sun Q, Fu Y, Sun A, Shou Y, Zheng M, Li X, Fan D (2011) Correlation of E-selectin gene polymorphisms 756 
with risk of ischemic stroke A meta-analysis. Neural Regen Res 6. 757 
Tian Y, Kang L, Wang H, Liu Z (2011) Meta-analysis of transcranial magnetic stimulation to treat post-758 
stroke dysfunction. Neural Regen Res 6. 759 
Trzesniak C, Kempton MJ, Busatto GF, de Oliveira IR, Galvao-de Almeida A, Kambeitz J, Ferrari MCF, 760 
Santos Filho A, Chagas MH, Zuardi AW (2011) Adhesio interthalamica alterations in 761 
Power-up  Nord et al.  
 
30 
 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Prog 762 
Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry 35:877–886. 763 
Veehof MM, Oskam M-J, Schreurs KM, Bohlmeijer ET (2011) Acceptance-based interventions for the 764 
treatment of chronic pain: a systematic review and meta-analysis. PAIN® 152:533–542. 765 
Vergouwen MD, Etminan N, Ilodigwe D, Macdonald RL (2011) Lower incidence of cerebral infarction 766 
correlates with improved functional outcome after aneurysmal subarachnoid hemorrhage. J 767 
Cereb Blood Flow Metab 31:1545–1553. 768 
Vieta E, Günther O, Locklear J, Ekman M, Miltenburger C, Chatterton ML, Åström M, Paulsson B 769 
(2011) Effectiveness of psychotropic medications in the maintenance phase of bipolar 770 
disorder: a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials. Int J Neuropsychopharmacol 771 
14:1029–1049. 772 
Wand MP, Marron JS, Ruppert D (1991) Transformations in density estimation. J Am Stat Assoc 773 
86:343–353. 774 
Wisdom NM, Callahan JL, Hawkins KA (2011) The effects of apolipoprotein E on non-impaired 775 
cognitive functioning: a meta-analysis. Neurobiol Aging 32:63–74. 776 
Witteman J, van IJzendoorn MH, van de Velde D, van Heuven VJ, Schiller NO (2011) The nature of 777 
hemispheric specialization for linguistic and emotional prosodic perception: a meta-analysis 778 
of the lesion literature. Neuropsychologia 49:3722–3738. 779 
Woon F, Hedges DW (2011) Gender does not moderate hippocampal volume deficits in adults with 780 
posttraumatic stress disorder: A meta-analysis. Hippocampus 21:243–252. 781 
Xuan C, Zhang B-B, Li M, Deng K-F, Yang T, Zhang X-E (2011) No association between APOE epsilon 4 782 
allele and multiple sclerosis susceptibility: a meta-analysis from 5472 cases and 4727 783 
controls. J Neurol Sci 308:110–116. 784 
Yang W, Kong F, Liu M, Hao Z (2011a) Systematic review of risk factors for progressive ischemic 785 
stroke. Neural Regen Res 6:346–352. 786 
Yang Z, Li W, Huang T, Chen J, Zhang X (2011b) Meta-analysis of Ginkgo biloba extract for the 787 
treatment of Alzheimer’s disease. Neural Regen Res 6:1125–1129. 788 
Yuan H, Yang X, Kang H, Cheng Y, Ren H, Wang X (2011) Meta-analysis of tau genetic polymorphism 789 
and sporadic progressive supranuclear palsy susceptibility. Neural Regen Res 6:353–359. 790 
Zafar SN, Iqbal A, Farez MF, Kamatkar S, de Moya MA (2011) Intensive insulin therapy in brain injury: 791 
a meta-analysis. J Neurotrauma 28:1307–1317. 792 
Zhang Y, Zhang J, Tian C, Xiao Y, Li X, He C, Huang J, Fan H (2011) The− 1082G/A polymorphism in IL-793 
10 gene is associated with risk of Alzheimer’s disease: a meta-analysis. J Neurol Sci 303:133–794 
138. 795 
Zhu Y, He Z-Y, Liu H-N (2011) Meta-analysis of the relationship between homocysteine, vitamin B 12, 796 
folate, and multiple sclerosis. J Clin Neurosci 18:933–938. 797 
    798 
Power-up  Nord et al.  
 
31 
 
 799 





